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Chapter	1	
Introduction	to	Life	and	Evolution	 
Lorenzo	Baravalle	and	Luciana	Zaterka	 
 
During	the	last	decades,	increasing	attention	has	been	paid	in	Latin	America	to	the	history	and	philosophy	
of	biology.	As	attested	by	the	creation	and	growth	of	many	specialized	journals,	many	scholars	have	
actively	engaged	in	this	field,	producing	high-quality	research.	Although	several	authors	regularly	publish	
in	English,	most	of	them	still	prefer	to	write	in	Spanish	or	in	Portuguese	and,	for	this	reason,	their	ideas	
have	barely	crossed	the	boundaries	of	the	continent.	This	book	aims	to	remedy	this	state	of	affairs,	by	
offering	to	the	international	reader	a	collection	of	original	articles	by	some	of	the	most	skillful	historians	
and	philosophers	of	biology	currently	working	in	Latin	American	universities.	 
The	invited	authors	have	been	chosen	following	three	main	criteria.	First	of	all,	of	course,	the	excellence	
of	their	work.	They	all	have	published	in	well-established	peer-reviewed	journals	and	have	either	
promising	or	already	recognized	academic	trajectories.	Secondly,	we	have	attempted	to	maximize	the	
geographical	representativeness:	among	the	invited	authors,	there	are	researchers	from	Argentinian,	
Brazilian,	Chilean,	Colombian,	and	Mexican	universities.	Finally,	in	order	to	preserve	a	plurality	of	
perspectives,	we	have	carefully	selected	scholars	with	somehow	different	intellectual	backgrounds:	some	
of	them	are	philosophers	of	science	or	epistemologists,	while	others	have	a	formal	education	in	biology	or	
other	scientific	fields	and	a	keen	interest	for	the	history	of	science.	 
Notice	that	our	emphasis	on	the	regional	provenance	of	the	invited	authors	is	not	intended	to	suggest	the	
existence	of	something	like	a	Latin	American	history	and	philosophy	of	biology,	supposedly	endowed	
with	distinctive	features.	On	the	contrary,	we	firmly	believe	that	advances	in	this	field	can	be	achieved	
only	by	stimulating	the	integration	of	local	authors	into	the	international	debate.	Accordingly,	we	have	
selected	as	central	themes	of	the	book	two	topics,	that	is,	life	and	evolution,	which	are	at	the	same	time	
representatives	of	the	interests	of	our	invited	authors	and	of	the	worldwide	community.	Regarding	the	
first	topic,	the	book	includes	contributions	ranging	from	the	history	of	the	concept	of	life	to	the	
philosophical	reflection	on	life	manipulation	and	life	extension	while,	concerning	the	topic	of	evolution,	it	
includes	articles	on	the	structure	of	evolutionary	theory,	its	historical	development,	and	human	evolution.	
In	order	to	ensure	the	book’s	coherence	and	impact,	we	encouraged	the	authors	to	explore,	as	far	as	
possible,	connections	between	the	two	topics	and	engage	in	debates	with	each	other	as	well	as	with	
leading	international	researchers.		
Of	course,	a	book	of	this	kind	–	aimed	to	reflect	a	plurality	of	perspectives	more	than	attain	some	unitary	
goal	–	inevitably	entails	a	certain	degree	of	heterogeneity.	We	hope	that	the	reader	will	be	able	to	
appreciate	our	effort	for	bringing	different	views	and	conceptions	together,	forgiving	us	for	some	
conceptual	leaps	between	chapters.	While	our	selection	of	authors	is	certainly	representative	of	the	
geographi-	cal,	disciplinary,	and	theoretical	differences	in	the	area,	it	is	sadly	also	representa-	tive	of	the	
limited	presence	of	women	in	the	field.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	some	of	the	most	important	contributions	
to	the	diffusion	of	the	history	and	philosophy	of	biology	in	Latin	America	were	made	by	women	(see	next	
section),	the	field	is	still	prevalently	masculine.	Actually,	in	many	Latin	American	countries	this	situation	
is	common	in	many	areas	of	philosophy.	We	sincerely	hope	that	this	state	of	affairs	may	change	in	the	
near	future.	 
In	the	remaining	of	this	introductory	chapter	we	first	sketch	a	brief	history	of	the	history	and	philosophy	
of	biology	in	Latina	America	and,	then,	we	discuss	in	more	detail	the	content	of	the	authors’	contributions.	 
 
 
1.1	The	History	and	Philosophy	of	Biology	in	Latin	America	 
The	institutionalization	of	the	history	and	philosophy	of	biology	as	autonomous	disciplinary	fields	is	
relatively	recent	in	Latin	America.	Although	historical	and	philosophical	reflections	on	biological	subjects	
and	practices	were	not	completely	absent	in	the	previous	decades,	it	is	only	from	the	1990s	that	
scientists,	historians,	and	philosophers	of	science	started	to	pay	systematic	attention	to	conceptual	issues	
surrounding	genetics,	evolution,	and	development.	 
Mexican	scholars	played	a	prominent	role	in	the	creation	of	academic	platforms	aimed	to	promote	the	
debate	in	this	area	of	knowledge.	The	Institute	for	Philosophical	Investigations	of	the	National	
Autonomous	University	of	Mexico	(UNAM	-	Mexico	City)	was	possibly	the	first	institution	to	organize	
research	activities	related	to	the	history	and	the	philosophy	of	biology	in	the	region.	This	academic	
ferment	resulted	in	a	series	of	milestone	publications,	such	as	Historia	y	explicacion	en	biología	(“History	
and	Explanation	in	Biology”;	Martı́nez	and	Barahona	1998),	in	which	original	essays	by	Latin	American	
historians	and	philosophers	were	collected	along	with	Spanish	translations	of	classic	works	by	Richard	
Lewontin,	Ernst	Mayr,	Stuart	Kaufmann,	and	David	Hull	(among	others).	 
The	creation	of	a	research	group	on	evolution	and	cognition	in	the	Centre	for	Philosophical,	Political	and	
Social	Studies	Vicente	Lombardo	Toledano	(Mexico	City)	led,	in	1999,	to	the	publication	of	the	first	Ibero-
American	international	journal	entirely	dedicated	to	the	philosophy	of	the	life	sciences,	Ludus	Vitalis.1	In	
the	same	year,	Oaxaca	was	the	venue	of	the	second	congress	of	the	International	Society	for	the	History,	
Philosophy	and	Social	Studies	of	Biology	(ISHPSSB).	These	two	circumstances	greatly	contributed	to	the	
further	diffusion	of	the	debate	and	the	professionalization	of	the	disciplinary	field	in	Mexico	and	in	other	
Latin	America	countries,	especially	Colombia,	Brazil,	and	Argentina.	 
From	the	intellectual	exchange	of	scholars	from	these	countries	(among	them,	Gustavo	Caponi	and	
Alejandro	Rosas,	who	have	both	contributed	to	the	realization	of	the	present	book),	the	first	Latin	
American	international	network	of	history	and	philosophy	of	biology	emerged	in	2004.	It	was	called	the	
Bogotá	group,	and	organized	meetings	until	2012.	In	that	year,	the	members	of	the	Bogotá	group,	along	
with	colleagues	from	Spanish	universities,	founded	the	Ibero-American	Association	of	Philosophy	of	
Biology	(AIFIBI).	The	first	congress,	in	Valencia,	counted	with	the	participation	of	many	researchers	from	
both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	The	second	and	third	congresses,	respectively	in	Valle	de	Bravo	(Mexico)	in	
2015	and	in	Bogotá	in	2018,	further	consolidated	the	Spanish	and	Portuguese	speaking	community	of	his-	
torians	and	philosophers	of	biology.	 
Other,	both	national	and	international,	associations	contributed	to	this	goal.	The	most	notable	are	
possibly	the	Brazilian	Association	of	Philosophy	and	History	of	Biology	(ABFHiB)	–	whose	current	
directorship	includes	two	contributors	of	the	present	book	(Charbel	Niño	El-Hani	and	Lilian	Al-Chueyr	
Pereira	Martins)	–	and	the	Association	for	Philosophy	and	History	of	Science	of	the	South	Cone	(AFHIC).	
ABFHiB	has	been	organizing	regular	meetings	since	2006.	In	2017,	it	offered	the	logistic	support	for	the	
ISHPSSB	congress	in	São	Paulo.	ABFHiB	also	edits	a	biannual	specialist	journal,	Philosophy	and	History	of	
Biology.	Although	more	generally	oriented	towards	the	history	and	philosophy	of	science,	AFHIC,	which	
has	been	organizing	congresses	every	2	years	since	1998	in	different	countries	of	South	America	(Brazil,	
Argentina,	Uruguay,	Chile	and,	in	2020,	Colombia),	has	provided	an	important	platform	for	stimulating	
the	debate	in	the	history	and	philosophy	of	biology.	 
From	this	intense	research	activity	several	noteworthy	publications	have	stemmed.	Among	the	most	
influential	monographies,	we	find,	in	Mexico,	La	explicación	teleológica	(“The	Teleological	Explanation”)	
by	Margarita	Ponce	(1977),	El	método	de	la	ciencia:	epistemología	y	darwinismo	(“The	Method	of	Science:	
Epistemology	and	Darwinism”)	by	Rosaura	Ruiz	and	Francisco	Ayala	(1998),	and	El	sesgo	hereditario	
(“The	Hereditary	Bias”)	by	Carlos	López	Beltrán	(2004).	Outside	Mexico,	especially	notable	are	La	
ontogenia	del	pensamiento	evolutivo:	hacia	una	interpretación	semiótica	de	la	Naturaleza	(“The	Ontogeny	
of	Evolutionary	Thinking:	Towards	a	Semiotic	Interpretation	of	Nature”)	by	Eugenio	Andrade	 
1Actually,	the	Centre	had	been	previously	publishing	another	journal,	Uroboros,	discontinued	in	1997.	 
 
 
(1998),	Leyes	sin	causa	y	causas	sin	ley	(“Laws	without	Cause	and	Causes	without	Law”)	by	Gustavo	
Caponi	(2014),	and	La	teoría	de	la	selección	natural:	una	exploración	metacientífica	(“The	Theory	of	
Natural	Selection:	A	Metascientific	Exploration”)	by	Santiago	Ginnobili	(2018),	to	mention	just	a	few.	 
As	examples	of	the	collective	books	edited	over	the	last	years,	we	can	moreover	cite	Filosofia	da	Biologia	
(“Philosophy	of	Biology”;	Abrantes	2011),	which	collects	in	Portuguese	an	impressive	selection	of	articles	
written	by	the	members	of	the	Bogotá	group,	or	Darwin’s	Evolving	Legacy	(Martı́nez-Contreras	and	Ponce	
de	León	2011),	a	book	aimed	at	promoting	an	interdisciplinary	debate	between	biologists,	historians,	and	
philosophers.	Besides	the	already	mentioned	Ludus	Vitalis	and	Philosophy	and	History	of	Biology,	many	
other	Latin	American	journals	dedicated	to	the	general	history	and	philosophy	of	science	have	paid	great	
attention	to	the	debate	in	the	history	and	philosophy	of	biology.	Among	them,	the	most	important	are	
possibly	Scientiae	Studia	in	Brazil	(which	included	in	its	editorial	board	many	of	the	authors	of	the	
present	book),	Revista	colombiana	de	filosofía	de	la	ciencia	in	Colombia,	and	Metatheoria	in	Argentina	
(whose	chief	editor,	Pablo	Lorenzano,	is	one	of	the	contributors	of	this	book).	 
1.2	Content	of	the	Book	 
Although	the	articles	here	collected	are	to	a	considerable	extent	heterogeneous,	we	have	attempted	to	
maximize	the	coherence	of	the	volume	by	starting	from	the	most	historical	contributions,	proceeding	
progressively	to	the	most	philosophical	ones.	In	this	section,	besides	summarizing	the	content	of	each	
chapter,	we	shall	draw	some	connections	between	them.	 
Lilian	Al-Chueyr	Pereira	Martins	opens	the	book	with	a	discussion	on	the	important	controversy	over	
biological	inheritance	that	took	place	in	Great	Britain	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century	between	
the	Mendelians,	headed	by	William	Bateson,	and	the	biometricians,	headed	by	Walter	Frank	Raphael	
Weldon	and	Karl	Pearson.	As	it	is	well	known,	the	biometrical	school	advocated	a	theory	of	blending	
inheritance	grounded	on	Galton’s	law	of	ancestral	heredity,	whereas	the	Mendelians	interpreted	the	units	
of	biological	inheritance	as	discrete	particles,	i.e.	the	genes.	While	biometricians	supported	their	thesis	by	
employing	sophisticated	statistical	methods,	the	Mendelians	privileged	experiments	with	hybrids	
obtained	through	crossings	with	animals	and	plants.	Through	the	analysis	of	a	rich	and	extensive	
bibliographical	material	–	including	published	and	unpublished	manuscripts	and	correspondence	–	
Pereira	Martins	investigates	the	role	that	the	struggle	for	authority	played	in	the	controversy.	She	focuses	
especially	on	the	figure	of	Weldon	and	on	his	late	attempt	of	reconciliation	between	Mendelism	and	
biometry.	In	Pereira	Martins’	opinion,	the	fact	that	Weldon	admitted	the	possibility	of	such	reconciliation	
only	towards	the	end	of	his	life	supports	the	claim	that	one	of	the	main	factors	that	originally	motivated	
the	controversy	was	the	desire,	of	the	leading	figures	of	Mendelism	and	biometry,	to	obtain	supremacy	in	
the	field	of	heredity	and	evolution.	 
In	Chap.	3,	Ronei	Clécio	Mocellin	and	Luciana	Zaterka	present	a	discussion	on	the	relation	between	
“blood,	practice	of	transfusions	and	longevity”	from	modernity	to	the	present	days.	From	the	
investigation	of	three	historical	episodes	in	which	blood	transfusions	were	associated	with	the	fight	
against	senescence,	they	argue	about	the	existence	of	a	common	epistemological	research	program.	This	
is	the	application	of	what	the	authors	call	the	“Baconian	research	program.”	The	first	episode	concerns	
the	metaphysical-theological	foundation	of	this	program,	especially	in	Francis	Bacon	and	Robert	Boyle’s	
works,	and	the	reasons	that	subsequently	led,	in	the	second	half	of	the	seventeenth	century	in	France,	to	
the	abandonment	and	even	the	banning	of	blood	transfusions.	The	second	historical	study	highlights	
some	ideas	and	practices	carried	out	by	the	Russian	doctor	and	philosopher	Alexander	Alexandrovich	
Malinovsky-Bogdanov,	the	director	of	the	first	world	institution	exclusively	devoted	to	the	study	of	blood	
and	transfusion.	The	last	historical	study	deals	with	the	contemporary	concept	of	blood,	especially	in	the	
context	of	the	philosophical	movement	known	as	transhumanism.	 
Maurizio	Esposito	and	Gabriel	Vallejos	Baccelliere,	in	Chap.	4,	analyze	the	so-called	performative	
epistemology	(Pickering	1995).	From	this	perspective,	the	philosophical	focus	is	on	how	“reality”	or	
“nature”	are	technically	and	materially	mastered	and	tamed.	Science	is	a	collection	of	practices	and	not	
just	a	theoretical	enterprise.	Throughout	the	text,	the	authors	spell	out	the	epistemological	conse-	
quences	of	this	methodological	position.	In	a	scientific	world	where	entities	are	not	just	thought	or	
represented	but	touched,	used	and	transformed,	the	question	about	their	existence	does	not	really	
matter.	What	does	matter	is,	rather,	to	what	extent	we	can	understand,	through	our	experimental	
 
 
practices,	how	natural	processes	work.	By	assuming	the	centrality	of	this	question,	Esposito	and	Vallejos	
highlight	four	principal	aspects	of	experimental	practice:	constrained	action,	standardization,	epistemic	
“tightening,”	and	extrapolation.	Altogether,	these	points	chart	what	they	call	the	Epistemic	Experimental	
Space	(EES),	i.e.	the	abstract	space	in	which	experimental	knowledge	is	produced,	assessed,	and	validated.	
The	authors	show	how	the	integration	within	this	space	makes	experimental	knowledge	in	biology	a	
highly	consistent,	reliable,	and	successful	epistemic	activity.	 
By	adopting	an	organizational	perspective	on	ecological	systems,	Charbel	Niño	El-Hani	and	Nei	Nunes	
Neto	investigate,	in	Chap.	5,	how	the	transition	from	a	physicochemical	to	a	life-constrained	world	
occurred.	In	their	opinion,	this	transition	can	be	conceptualized	as	a	passage	from	a	closure	of	processes	
to	a	closure	of	constraints	in	the	ecological	realm.	While	processes	produce	physicochemical	changes,	
constraints	are	entities	that	act	upon	processes,	reducing	their	degree	of	freedom	while	remaining	
unaffected	by	them	(Moreno	and	Mossio	2015).	After	having	offered	a	detailed	elucidation	of	these	
concepts,	the	authors	illustrate	the	passage	from	a	closure	of	processes	to	a	closure	of	constraints	through	
a	discussion	of	the	CLAW	(so	called	after	their	proponents,	Charlson,	Lovelock,	Andreae,	and	Warren)	
hypothesis.	The	CLAW	hypothesis	explains	the	production	of	clouds	over	the	oceans,	affecting	climate	at	a	
global	scale,	as	the	result	of	a	coupling	between	the	physicochemical	flow	of	matter	and	the	activity	of	
living	systems.	El-Hani	and	Nunes	Neto	argue	that	this	is	a	good	example	of	what	happens	in	the	
transition	from	an	abiotic	ecological	to	a	“life-constrained”	ecological	system	and,	thus,	support	our	
understanding	of	the	role	of	life	on	Earth.	 
In	continuity	with	this	discussion,	Alejandro	Rosas	and	Juan	Diego	Morales	face	up,	in	Chap.	6,	one	of	the	
most	formidable	problems	of	modern	philosophy	since	Kant,	that	is,	the	emergence	and	the	nature	of	
purposiveness,	or	teleology,	in	living	beings.	The	authors	approach	the	question	drawing	on	the	recent	
work	of	the	chemist	Addy	Pross	(2012).	According	to	Pross’	view,	the	origin	of	life	is	to	be	found	in	certain	
interactions	between	three	molecular	structures:	replicators,	metabolic	enzymes,	and	membranes.	The	
subsequent	evolutionary	steps	involved	tentative	complexifications	of	these	interactions,	followed	by	the	
natural	selection	of	the	most	stable	chemical	networks	of	reaction.	Rosas	and	Morales	notice	that,	
throughout	this	gradual	process,	it	is	crucial	that	associations	between	molecules	provide	mutual	
benefits.	In	their	opinion,	this	corresponds	to	a	primitive	case	of	cooperative	dynamic.	Cooperation,	in	its	
turn,	involves	goals.	In	the	case	of	molecules,	the	shared	goal	is	to	maintain	wholes	that	guarantee	their	
persistence	by	drawing	energy	from	the	environment	and	replicating.	The	self-maintenance	of	the	wholes	
is	not	merely	an	effect	of	the	interaction	between	the	molecules	but,	compatible	with	Kant’s	
characterization	of	a	“natural	end,”	it	is	itself	a	cause	of	the	behavior	of	the	molecules.	It	is	hard	to	say	at	
which	stage	of	the	integration	of	the	molecules	within	the	wholes	teleology	actually	emerges,	but	Rosas	
and	Morales	confidently	argue	that	teleology	is	not	an	apparent	but	a	real	feature	of	the	organic	world.	 
The	topic	of	Chap.	7,	by	Maximiliano	Martı́nez,	Alejandro	Mosqueda,	and	Jorge	Oseguera,	is	the	relation	
between	evolution	and	moral	realism.	The	so-called	debunking	argument,	put	forward	by	some	naturalist	
philosophers,	is	aimed	to	show	that	natural	selection	and	moral	realism	are	incompatible.	From	the	very	
same	naturalist	standpoint,	the	authors	of	the	chapter	aim	to	challenge	such	a	conclusion	and	argue	that	
moral	realism	can	be	scientifically	grounded.	In	order	to	develop	their	account,	Martı́nez,	Mosqueda,	and	
Oseguera	take	as	their	critical	target	Street’s	version	of	the	debunking	argument	(Street	2006).	According	
to	Street,	the	main	problem	of	moral	realism	is	that	it	needs	to	postulate	moral	truths	that	are	
independent	of	our	evaluative	attitudes.	Moral	behavior	in	our	species	would	be	a	consequence	of	the	fact	
that	natural	selection	made	us	track	moral	truths.	Yet,	Street	considers	that	an	alternative	anti-realist	
explanation,	which	does	not	invoke	independent	moral	truths,	is	possible,	more	parsimonious	and,	thus,	
naturalistically	preferable.	Martı́nez,	Mosqueda,	and	Oseguera’s	overall	strategy	against	Street’s	argument	
consists	in	showing	that	moral	realists	do	not	need	to	commit	themselves	to	the	existence	of	independent	
moral	facts,	but	just	to	independent	evaluative	facts.	From	an	evolutionary	perspective,	these	facts	can	be	
considered	as	facts	about	what	increases	fitness	in	specific	circumstances.	Explanations	of	moral	
behaviour	invoking	this	kind	of	facts	are	not	less	parsimonious	than	the	anti-realist	ones	and,	thus,	moral	
realism	is	not	debunked.	 
Gustavo	Caponi	discusses,	in	Chap.	8,	the	analytic	relations	between	three	fundamental	concepts	of	the	
theory	of	natural	selection,	that	is,	the	concepts	of	biological	function,	fitness,	and	adaptation.	He	assumes	
that	the	concept	of	adaptation	needs	to	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	the	concept	of	fitness	and,	in	its	turn,	the	
concept	of	fitness	needs	to	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	the	concept	of	biological	function.	Caponi	holds	that	
 
 
this	task	can	be	made	easier	if	we	consider	these	three	concepts	as	speci-	fications	of	other	three	broader	
concepts.	These	are,	respectively,	the	concept	of	function,	the	concept	of	effectiveness,	and	the	concept	of	
design.	The	main	goal	of	the	author	is	to	show	how	the	theory	of	natural	selection	interprets	and	connects	
these	notions	so	as	to	provide	a	solid	framework	for	a	naturalization	of	teleology	(a	topic	that,	besides	
being	the	subject	of	Chap.	6,	will	return	in	Chap.	11).	The	corner-	stone	of	Caponi’s	analysis	is	his	
interpretation	of	the	notion	of	function	as	a	causal	role	(derived,	but	with	some	important	differences,	
from	Cummins	1975).	This	interpretation	is	developed	in	opposition	to	the	etiological	conception	of	
function	(Wright	1973).	In	Caponi’s	view,	the	etiological	conception	leads	to	unavoidable	circularities.	On	
the	contrary,	insofar	as	it	clearly	distinguishes	between	function	and	raison	d’être,	the	causal	role	
conception	allows	a	straightforward	naturalistic	analysis	of	the	notion	of	effectiveness	and,	indirectly,	of	
design.	 
In	Chap.	9,	Lorenzo	Baravalle	and	Davide	Vecchi	take	side	in	the	long-standing	controversy	between	
causalist	and	statisticalist	interpreters	of	evolutionary	theory.	More	specifically,	they	argue	for	a	
dynamical	view,	according	to	which	selection,	drift,	migration,	mutation,	and	the	other	factors	of	
evolution	are	not	just	causes,	but	may	be	considered	as	forces	of	evolution.	In	order	to	support	this	claim,	
they	focus	their	analysis	on	one	of	the	most	controversial	evolutionary	factors,	that	is,	genetic	drift.	
Baravalle	and	Vecchi	first	argue	that	drift	is	a	cause	because	the	evolutionary	explanations	invoking	
events	instantiating	drift	processes	are,	compatibly	with	Woodward’s	(2003)	manipulationist	account	of	
explanation,	causal.	Then,	they	argue	that	the	function	of	the	concept	of	drift	in	such	explanations	is	
precisely	that	of	unifying	sundry	events	in	accordance	to	the	specific	causal	role	that	they	play	in	a	certain	
evolutionary	scenario.	Following	Hitchcock	and	Woodward	(2003),	Baravalle	and	Vecchi	characterize	the	
explanations	in	which	analogous	unificatory	causal	concepts	appear	as	deep	explanations.	They	thus	
observe	that	force-	explanations	in	Newtonian	mechanics	are,	in	a	sense,	nothing	more	than	a	kind	of	
deep	explanation.	They	are	deep	explanations	because	the	notion	of	force	plays	in	them	a	causal	
unificatory	role.	On	the	base	of	this	common	explanatory	function,	the	authors	conclude	that	drift	can	be	
considered	as	a	force.	 
Within	the	heterogeneous	family	of	the	semantic	approaches	to	the	structure	of	scientific	theories,	
metatheoretical	(or	Sneedean)	structuralism	is	certainly	the	one	that	has	been	most	developed	and	
refined	in	Latin	America	(Diez	and	Lorenzano	2002).	Pablo	Lorenzano	and	Martı́n	Andrés	Dı́az	show,	in	
Chap.	10,	how	it	can	be	employed	in	philosophy	of	biology	to	solve	old	problems	related	to	the	existence	
of	biological	laws,	the	relation	between	biological	models	and	theories,	and	theoretical	unification	in	
biology.	After	having	introduced	some	of	the	main	conceptual	tools	of	metatheoretical	structuralism,	
Lorenzano	and	Dı́az	sketch	a	structuralist	reconstruction	of	a	biological	theory,	i.e.	population	dynamics.	
They	thus	argue	for	the	existence	of	a	“first	law”	of	population	dynamics,	that	is,	a	guiding	principle	that	
heuristically	orients	the	theoretical	work	of	population	dynamicists	by	pointing	out	what	class	of	
circumstances	is	indissolubly	related	to	the	phenomena	under	study.	The	guiding	principle	coordinates	
the	models	that	population	dynamicists	formulate,	in	order	to	account	for	specific	factors	influencing	
demographic	processes,	within	a	unified	theoretical	framework.	Through	this	analysis,	Lorenzano	and	
Dı́az	show	that,	in	spite	of	their	specificities,	biological	theories	do	not	structurally	differ	from	physical	
ones.	 
Another	application	of	metatheoretical	structuralism	is	provided	in	the	last	chapter	by	Andrea	Soledad	
Olmos,	Ariel	Jonathan	Roffé	and	Santiago	Ginnobili.	Here	the	goal	is	to	test	whether	the	reduction	of	
functional	language	developed	by	systemic	analysis	is	successful.	To	this	aim,	the	authors	first	outline	the	
theoretical	structure	of	systemic	analysis.	This	reconstruction	guides	the	subsequent	critical	discussion.	
Olmos,	Roffé,	and	Ginnobili	raise	two	main	concerns	about	the	adequacy	of	the	systemic	approach.	The	
first	one	is	related	to	its	comprehensiveness.	The	authors	argue	that	although	the	systemic	approach	is	
fruitful	to	account	for	some	portions	of	biological	practices	(especially	in	areas	such	as	molecular	biology,	
neuroscience,	and	neuroethology),	it	cannot	adequately	explicate	the	notion	of	biological	function	in	all	its	
uses.	The	second	concern	refers	to	the	explanatory	strategy	grounding	functional	systemic	analyses.	In	a	
systemic	analysis,	structure	is	taken	to	explain	function.	By	contrast,	Olmos,	Roffé,	and	Ginnobili	argue	
that	in	functional	explanations	it	is	function	that	explains	structure.	In	sum,	they	show	that,	while	it	is	true	
that	systemic	analysis	is	an	important	component	of	functional	attributions,	it	does	not	by	itself	account	
for	the	use	of	functional	language	in	biology.	 
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